Mifare Classic Card cloning with Proxmark3 - Revision history

DDukic: Changed look of References

2021-12-20T14:57:30Z

Changed look of References

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:57, 20 December 2021
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	* [[Proxmark3: Installation]]		* [[Proxmark3: Installation]]

	== RFID/NFC security of smart cards ==		== RFID/NFC security of smart cards <ref name="refone"/> ==
	Instead of passcodes, magnetic stripe cards, and paper tickets, many companies have introduced RFID and contactless smart cards. Contactless smart cards contain a small memory that can be accessed wirelessly. Unlike RFID tags, smart cards are also capable of computing. Most smart cards are encrypted using methods similar to symmetric encryption to restrict access to the memory and programs.<br>		Instead of passcodes, magnetic stripe cards, and paper tickets, many companies have introduced RFID and contactless smart cards. Contactless smart cards contain a small memory that can be accessed wirelessly. Unlike RFID tags, smart cards are also capable of computing. Most smart cards are encrypted using methods similar to symmetric encryption to restrict access to the memory and programs.<br>
	The best-known use of smartcards in local transport is the Oyster Card from London, which is used for buses and underground trains. Most countries already have smart card chips integrated into their passports. Some buildings and security facilities already use contactless smart cards as access control systems.<br>		The best-known use of smartcards in local transport is the Oyster Card from London, which is used for buses and underground trains. Most countries already have smart card chips integrated into their passports. Some buildings and security facilities already use contactless smart cards as access control systems.<br>
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	Based on the described attack method, the researchers decided to rebuild the hardware. By rebuilding the Mifare card, the researchers were able to identify a faulty 16-bit random number generator, which can be used to predict the next random number, and a critical part that handles the encryption was also found. With the vulnerabilities found, it is possible to guess 32 bits of the key, which takes only a few minutes to crack with a normal computer.		Based on the described attack method, the researchers decided to rebuild the hardware. By rebuilding the Mifare card, the researchers were able to identify a faulty 16-bit random number generator, which can be used to predict the next random number, and a critical part that handles the encryption was also found. With the vulnerabilities found, it is possible to guess 32 bits of the key, which takes only a few minutes to crack with a normal computer.

	== Cloning the Mifare Classic with the Proxmark 3 ==		== Cloning the Mifare Classic with the Proxmark 3 <ref name="reftwo"/> ==
	To read the Mifare Classic card, we need the high frequency antenna. <br>		To read the Mifare Classic card, we need the high frequency antenna. <br>
	With the command <code>hf search</code>, we can identify the "unknown" card (<code>hf</code> stands for high frequency and <code>lf</code> for low frequency, <code>lf</code> would be use for low frequency cards).		With the command <code>hf search</code>, we can identify the "unknown" card (<code>hf</code> stands for high frequency and <code>lf</code> for low frequency, <code>lf</code> would be use for low frequency cards).
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	* [[:File:Proxmark.pdf\|Proxmark3: Securityanalyse der Universitätsausweise]]		* [[:File:Proxmark.pdf\|Proxmark3: Securityanalyse der Universitätsausweise]]
	* Yang Q., Huang L. (2018) RFID/NFC Security. In: Inside Radio: An Attack and Defense Guide. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8447-8_3		* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nYN7vC_ipzE
	* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nYN7vC_ipzE
	* https://blog.kchung.co/rfid-hacking-with-the-proxmark-3/
	* https://github.com/Proxmark/proxmark3/wiki/commands		* https://github.com/Proxmark/proxmark3/wiki/commands
			<references>
			<ref name="refone">Yang Q., Huang L. (2018) RFID/NFC Security. In: Inside Radio: An Attack and Defense Guide. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8447-8_3</ref>

			<ref name="reftwo">https://blog.kchung.co/rfid-hacking-with-the-proxmark-3/</ref>
			</references>

			[[Category:Documentation]]

DDukic: minor corrections carried out

2021-12-20T14:09:42Z

minor corrections carried out

DDukic: Finished

2021-12-20T13:13:00Z

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 == Cloning the Mifare Classic with the Proxmark 3 ==
 To read the Mifare Classic card, we need the high frequency antenna. <br>
-With the command '''hf search''', we can identify the "unknown" card (hf stands for high frequency and lf for low frequency, lf would be use for low frequency cards).
+With the command <code>hf search</code>, we can identify the "unknown" card (<code>hf</code> stands for high frequency and <code>lf</code> for low frequency, <code>lf</code> would be use for low frequency cards).

DDukic: First half finished

2021-12-20T12:38:52Z

First half finished

New page

== Summary ==
The Proxmark3 is used to show how to clone a Mifare Classic card and the NFC/RFID security of smart cards is discussed in general.

== Requirements ==
* [[Proxmark3 RDV2 Kit]]
* [[Proxmark3: Installation]]

== RFID/NFC security of smart cards ==
Instead of passcodes, magnetic stripe cards and paper tickets, many companies have introduced RFID and contactless smart cards. Contactless smart cards contain a small memory that can be accessed wirelessly. Unlike RFID tags, however, smart cards are also capable of computing. Most smart cards are encrypted using methods similar to symmetric encryption to restrict access to the memory and programmes. 
The best-known use of smartcards in local transport is the Oyster Card from London, which is used for buses and underground trains. Most countries already have smart card chips integrated into their passports. Some buildings and security facilities already use contactless smart cards as access control systems. 
There are many different types of contactless smart cards on the market, which differ in various aspects, such as the size of the housing or even the memory size and computing power, as well as the characteristics of the cards' potential security. The most widely used card on the market is the Mifare card, a series of contactless smart cards manufactured by NXP Semiconductors. The Mifare accounts for about 80% of the worldwide market for contactless smart cards. The Mifare Classic type complies with the ISO/IEC 14443 Type A standard and offers the security functions of cross-checking and data encryption with Crypto-1 Stream Cipher, a patented process from NXP Semiconductors with confidential designs.

=== Mifare Classic ===
Mifare Classic smart cards are available in two versions: 1 and 4K. The difference is that the 1K card has 1KB of EEPROM memory divided into 4 sectors with 16 blocks of 16 bytes each, while the 4K card has 4KB of EEPROM memory divided into 4 sectors with 32 blocks each. There are 16 additional sectors of 8 blocks each, for a total of 256 blocks. Again, the size of each block is 16 bytes. 
The first block of the Mifare Classic Smart Card contains a unique identifier (UID) that is hardcoded by the manufacturers, and the block is read-only once officially released, so a second erase and write is not possible.

If you want to create a clone of the card, you have to transfer both the UID and the data on the card to the new card, but for this you need special cards called "UID Changeable" that allow you to change the UID.

=== Mifare Classic Security ===
Mifare Classic smartcards are encrypted with the Crypto-1 encryption algorithm. Nohal and Plotz, two security researchers from the Berlin-based Chaos Computer Club (CCC), found several security vulnerabilities through a reverse analysis of the Mifare Classic. 
Prior to CCC Labs' discovery of the vulnerabilities, the most effective and common method was a simple brute-force attack for attacking the smartcards. The researchers focused the attack methods on the cards' operating model, as the internal encryption algorithm used was unknown. The cards relied on the card reader, so since the cards did not have a built-in power source, it took a lot of time to write the data to the EEPROM, which is why the cards did not record the number of incorrect passwords attempted. 
The time required for such brute force attacks is the biggest problem, as an attempt with a single key takes 5ms. If all 48-bit keys were tried, it would take close to 55,000 years to determine the true key. The determination can work if it is done on a computer. But since the encryption and verification algorithms are confidential from the card, one must obtain an encryption algorithm to effectively carry out an attack.
For security researchers, the chip of the Mifare card is a black box. In black box security analysis, the inputs and outputs are compared to derive the algorithm. But because Mifare uses a 48-bit encryption key, it is much more difficult to guess the algorithm used.
One of the biggest problems for the scientists was that the Mifare chip does not react to wrong keys. Which is why it is a design highlight of the Mifare Classic card. 
Based on the described attack method, the researchers decided to rebuild the hardware. By rebuilding the Mifare card, the researchers were able to identify a faulty 16-bit random number generator, which can be used to predict the next random number, and a critical part that handles the encryption. With the vulnerabilities found, it is possible to guess 32 bits of the key, which takes only a few minutes to crack with a normal computer.

== Cloning the Mifare Classic with the Proxmark 3 ==
To read the Mifare Classic card, we need the high frequency antenna. 
With the command '''hf search''', we can identify the "unknown" card (hf stands for high frequency and lf for low frequency, lf would be use for low frequency cards).

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:09, 20 December 2021
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	== Summary ==		== Summary ==
	The Proxmark3 is used to show how to clone a Mifare Classic card and the NFC/RFID security of smart cards is discussed ~~in general~~.		The Proxmark3 is used to show how to clone a Mifare Classic card and the NFC/RFID security of smart cards is discussed.

	== Requirements ==		== Requirements ==
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	== RFID/NFC security of smart cards ==		== RFID/NFC security of smart cards ==
	Instead of passcodes, magnetic stripe cards and paper tickets, many companies have introduced RFID and contactless smart cards. Contactless smart cards contain a small memory that can be accessed wirelessly. Unlike RFID tags~~, however~~, smart cards are also capable of computing. Most smart cards are encrypted using methods similar to symmetric encryption to restrict access to the memory and ~~programmes~~.<br>		Instead of passcodes, magnetic stripe cards, and paper tickets, many companies have introduced RFID and contactless smart cards. Contactless smart cards contain a small memory that can be accessed wirelessly. Unlike RFID tags, smart cards are also capable of computing. Most smart cards are encrypted using methods similar to symmetric encryption to restrict access to the memory and programs.<br>
	The best-known use of smartcards in local transport is the Oyster Card from London, which is used for buses and underground trains. Most countries already have smart card chips integrated into their passports. Some buildings and security facilities already use contactless smart cards as access control systems.<br>		The best-known use of smartcards in local transport is the Oyster Card from London, which is used for buses and underground trains. Most countries already have smart card chips integrated into their passports. Some buildings and security facilities already use contactless smart cards as access control systems.<br>
	There are many different types of contactless smart cards on the market, which differ in various aspects, such as the size of the housing or even the memory size and computing power, as well as the characteristics of the cards' potential security. The most widely used card on the market is the Mifare card, a series of contactless smart cards manufactured by NXP Semiconductors. ~~The~~ Mifare accounts for about 80% of the worldwide market for contactless smart cards. The Mifare Classic type complies with the ISO/IEC 14443 Type A standard and offers the security functions of cross-checking and data encryption with Crypto-1 Stream Cipher, a patented process from NXP Semiconductors ~~with confidential designs~~.		There are many different types of contactless smart cards on the market, which differ in various aspects, such as the size of the housing or even the memory size and computing power, as well as the characteristics of the cards' potential security. The most widely used card on the market is the Mifare card, a series of contactless smart cards manufactured by NXP Semiconductors. Mifare accounts for about 80% of the worldwide market for contactless smart cards. The Mifare Classic type complies with the ISO/IEC 14443 Type-A standard and offers the security functions of cross-checking and data encryption with Crypto-1 Stream Cipher, a patented process from NXP Semiconductors.

	=== Mifare Classic ===		=== Mifare Classic ===
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	The first block of the Mifare Classic Smart Card contains a unique identifier (UID) that is hardcoded by the manufacturers, and the block is read-only once officially released, so a second erase and write is not possible.		The first block of the Mifare Classic Smart Card contains a unique identifier (UID) that is hardcoded by the manufacturers, and the block is read-only once officially released, so a second erase and write is not possible.

	If you want to create a clone of the card, you have to transfer both the UID and the data on the card to the new card, but for this you need special cards called "UID Changeable" that allow you to change the UID.		If you want to create a clone of the card, you have to transfer both the UID and the data on the card to the new card, but for this, you need special cards called "UID Changeable" that allow you to change the UID.

	=== Mifare Classic Security ===		=== Mifare Classic Security ===
	Mifare Classic smartcards are encrypted with the Crypto-1 encryption algorithm. Nohal and Plotz, two security researchers from the Berlin-based Chaos Computer Club (CCC), found several security vulnerabilities through a reverse analysis of the Mifare Classic. <br>		Mifare Classic smartcards are encrypted with the Crypto-1 encryption algorithm. Nohal and Plotz, two security researchers from the Berlin-based Chaos Computer Club (CCC), found several security vulnerabilities through a reverse analysis of the Mifare Classic. <br>
	Prior to CCC Labs' discovery of the vulnerabilities, the most effective and common method was a simple brute-force attack for attacking the smartcards. The researchers focused the attack methods on the cards' operating model, as the internal encryption algorithm used was unknown. The cards relied on the card reader, so since the cards did not have a built-in power source, it took a lot of time to write the data to the EEPROM, which is why the cards did not record the number of incorrect passwords attempted. <br>		Prior to CCC Labs' discovery of the vulnerabilities, the most effective and common method was a simple brute-force attack for attacking the smartcards. The researchers focused the attack methods on the cards' operating model, as the internal encryption algorithm used was unknown. The cards relied on the card reader, so since the cards did not have a built-in power source, it took a lot of time to write the data to the EEPROM, which is why the cards did not record the number of incorrect passwords attempted. <br>
	The time required for such brute force attacks is the biggest problem, as an attempt with a single key takes 5ms. If all 48-bit keys were tried, it would take close to 55,000 years to determine the true key. The ~~determination~~ can work if it is done on a computer. But since the encryption and verification algorithms are confidential from the card, one must obtain an encryption algorithm to effectively carry out an attack.		The time required for such brute force attacks is the biggest problem, as an attempt with a single key takes 5ms. If all 48-bit keys were tried, it would take close to 55,000 years to determine the true key. The identification can work if it is done on a computer. But since the encryption and verification algorithms are confidential from the card, one must obtain an encryption algorithm to effectively carry out an attack.
	For security researchers, the chip of the Mifare card is a black box. In black box security analysis, the inputs and outputs are compared to derive the algorithm. But because Mifare uses a 48-bit encryption key, it is much more difficult to guess the algorithm used.		For security researchers, the chip of the Mifare card is a black-box. In black-box security analysis, the inputs and outputs are compared to derive the algorithm. But because Mifare uses a 48-bit encryption key, it is much more difficult to guess the algorithm used.
	One of the biggest problems for the scientists was that the Mifare chip does not react to wrong keys. ~~Which~~ is why it is a design highlight of the Mifare Classic card. <br>		One of the biggest problems for the scientists was that the Mifare chip does not react to the wrong keys. This is why it is a design highlight of the Mifare Classic card. <br>
	Based on the described attack method, the researchers decided to rebuild the hardware. By rebuilding the Mifare card, the researchers were able to identify a faulty 16-bit random number generator, which can be used to predict the next random number, and a critical part that handles the encryption. With the vulnerabilities found, it is possible to guess 32 bits of the key, which takes only a few minutes to crack with a normal computer.		Based on the described attack method, the researchers decided to rebuild the hardware. By rebuilding the Mifare card, the researchers were able to identify a faulty 16-bit random number generator, which can be used to predict the next random number, and a critical part that handles the encryption was also found. With the vulnerabilities found, it is possible to guess 32 bits of the key, which takes only a few minutes to crack with a normal computer.

	== Cloning the Mifare Classic with the Proxmark 3 ==		== Cloning the Mifare Classic with the Proxmark 3 ==
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	Valid ISO14443A Tag Found - Quitting Search		Valid ISO14443A Tag Found - Quitting Search

	In this case it is a Mifare 1k card. This also shows us the UID (<code>bc 4e a5 35</code>) of the card, which we will need later. From there we can find the keys used by comparing them to a list of standard keys with the "Test Block Keys" command.		In this case, it is a Mifare 1k card. This also shows us the UID (<code>bc 4e a5 35</code>) of the card, which we will need later. From there we can find the keys used by comparing them to a list of standard keys with the "Test Block Keys" command.

	proxmark3> hf mf chk * ?		proxmark3> hf mf chk * ?
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	Found valid key:[ffffffffffff]		Found valid key:[ffffffffffff]

	~~And you~~ can see that we can use the default key <code>ffffffffffffff</code> to read most of the blocks. With the nested attack, we can use our one usable key to identify the keys for the other blocks.		We can see that we can use the default key <code>ffffffffffffff</code> to read most of the blocks. With the nested attack, we can use our one usable key to identify the keys for the other blocks.

	proxmark3> hf mf nested 1 0 A ffffffffffff d		proxmark3> hf mf nested 1 0 A ffffffffffff d
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	This transfers the data from the card to the <code>dumpdata.bin</code> file. <br>		This transfers the data from the card to the <code>dumpdata.bin</code> file. <br>
	To copy this data to a new card, place the "UID Changeable" card on the ~~proxmark~~.		To copy this data to a new card, place the "UID Changeable" card on the Proxmark.

	With <code>hf mf restore 1</code> the saved data will be restored to the new card. <br>		With <code>hf mf restore 1</code> the saved data will be restored to the new card. <br>