User:AReicher - Revision history

AReicher at 18:22, 26 January 2021

2021-01-26T18:22:12Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:22, 26 January 2021
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	These vulnerabilities and growing public backlash, contributed to the Clipper Chip not being able to gain currency, in civilian industries. This lead to the eventual abandonment of the programm in the late 90s.		These vulnerabilities and growing public backlash, contributed to the Clipper Chip not being able to gain currency, in civilian industries. This lead to the eventual abandonment of the programm in the late 90s.


	~~[[Category:Documentation]]~~

AReicher at 18:17, 26 January 2021

2021-01-26T18:17:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:17, 26 January 2021
Line 59:		Line 59:

	These vulnerabilities and growing public backlash, contributed to the Clipper Chip not being able to gain currency, in civilian industries. This lead to the eventual abandonment of the programm in the late 90s.		These vulnerabilities and growing public backlash, contributed to the Clipper Chip not being able to gain currency, in civilian industries. This lead to the eventual abandonment of the programm in the late 90s.


			[[Category:Documentation]]

AReicher: /* Vulnerability */

2020-12-20T15:33:32Z

Vulnerability

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:33, 20 December 2020
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	The second more complex, allowed communication between a rogue (tampered) device and a non rogoue device.		The second more complex, allowed communication between a rogue (tampered) device and a non rogoue device.

			There was no easy fix for this, since the Clipper Chip intended the LEAF to contain a max. of 128Bits.
			This ment strengthening 1 area part of the LEAF left another more vulnerable to Brute Force attacks.

			These vulnerabilities and growing public backlash, contributed to the Clipper Chip not being able to gain currency, in civilian industries. This lead to the eventual abandonment of the programm in the late 90s.

AReicher: /* Vulnerability */

2020-12-20T15:26:37Z

Vulnerability

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:26, 20 December 2020
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	The Escrowed Encryption System used in the Clipper Chip had several vulnerabilities, that undermined its purpose,to encrypt communication saefly while giving autorised 3rd parties access.		The Escrowed Encryption System used in the Clipper Chip had several vulnerabilities, that undermined its purpose,to encrypt communication saefly while giving autorised 3rd parties access.
	The 1st publicised vulnerabilities were described by Matt Blaze in a paper called "Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard". Where Balze described (alongside a thorough analysis of the encryption techniques used within the Clipper Chip), 2 methods 3rd party decryption could be prevented, while retaining the encryption the Clipper Chip secured devices provide.		The 1st publicised vulnerabilities were described by Matt Blaze in a paper called "Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard". Where Balze described (alongside a thorough analysis of the encryption techniques used within the Clipper Chip), 2 methods 3rd party decryption could be prevented, while retaining the encryption the Clipper Chip secured devices provide.

			Te first technique was simpler and allows encrypted communication between 2 "rouge parties" (both devices were tampered with).
			By Brute Force attacking the 16Bit long checksum of the LEAF, a valid LEAF, containing invalid keys could be created. This made it possible, that 2 devices that had done this, to communicate, without 3rd parties having the needed encryption keys.


			The second more complex, allowed communication between a rogue (tampered) device and a non rogoue device.

AReicher: /* Vulnerability */

2020-12-20T15:15:34Z

Vulnerability

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:15, 20 December 2020
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	==Vulnerability==		==Vulnerability==
	The Escrowed Encryption System used in the Clipper Chip had several vulnerabilities, that undermined its purpose,to encrypt communication saefly while giving autorised 3rd parties access.		The Escrowed Encryption System used in the Clipper Chip had several vulnerabilities, that undermined its purpose,to encrypt communication saefly while giving autorised 3rd parties access.
			The 1st publicised vulnerabilities were described by Matt Blaze in a paper called "Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard". Where Balze described (alongside a thorough analysis of the encryption techniques used within the Clipper Chip), 2 methods 3rd party decryption could be prevented, while retaining the encryption the Clipper Chip secured devices provide.

AReicher: /* Vulnerability */

2020-12-20T15:09:15Z

Vulnerability

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:09, 20 December 2020
Line 46:		Line 46:

	==Vulnerability==		==Vulnerability==
			The Escrowed Encryption System used in the Clipper Chip had several vulnerabilities, that undermined its purpose,to encrypt communication saefly while giving autorised 3rd parties access.

AReicher: /* The encryption and decryption process */

2020-12-20T14:59:58Z

The encryption and decryption process

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:59, 20 December 2020
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	3. the session-key is used to decrypt the Communication.		3. the session-key is used to decrypt the Communication.

			==Vulnerability==

AReicher: /* The encryption and decryption process */

2020-12-20T14:58:53Z

The encryption and decryption process

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:58, 20 December 2020
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	'''The decryption:'''		'''The decryption:'''

	Prerequisite: Access to the LEAF ~~and following~~ Communication and knowledge of the family-key as well as the (unit-id/unit-key) pair is needed.		Prerequisite: Access to the LEAF, its related Communication and knowledge of the family-key as well as the (unit-id/unit-key) pair is needed.

	1. The Leaf is decrypted with the family-key, which reveals: the unit-id, the unit-key encrypted session-key and the LEAF checksum.		1. The Leaf is decrypted with the family-key, which reveals: the unit-id, the unit-key encrypted session-key and the LEAF checksum.

AReicher: /* The encryption and decryption process */

2020-12-20T14:57:56Z

The encryption and decryption process

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:57, 20 December 2020
Line 37:		Line 37:
	'''The decryption:'''		'''The decryption:'''

	Prerequisite: Access to the LEAF and following Communication is needed.		Prerequisite: Access to the LEAF and following Communication and knowledge of the family-key as well as the (unit-id/unit-key) pair is needed.

	1. The Leaf is decrypted with the family-key, which reveals: the unit-id, the unit-key encrypted session-key and the LEAF checksum.		1. The Leaf is decrypted with the family-key, which reveals: the unit-id, the unit-key encrypted session-key and the LEAF checksum.

	2. The ~~Unit~~-key is used to encrypt the session-key.		2. The unit-key is used to encrypt the session-key.

	3. the session-key is used to decrypt the Communication.		3. the session-key is used to decrypt the Communication.

AReicher: /* The encryption and decryption process */

2020-12-20T14:56:31Z

The encryption and decryption process

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:56, 20 December 2020
Line 39:		Line 39:
	Prerequisite: Access to the LEAF and following Communication is needed.		Prerequisite: Access to the LEAF and following Communication is needed.

	1. The Leaf is decrypted with the family-key, which reveals: the unit-~~key~~, the unit-key encrypted session-key and the LEAF checksum.		1. The Leaf is decrypted with the family-key, which reveals: the unit-id, the unit-key encrypted session-key and the LEAF checksum.

	2. The Unit-key is used to encrypt the session-key.		2. The Unit-key is used to encrypt the session-key.

	3. the session-key is used to decrypt the Communication.		3. the session-key is used to decrypt the Communication.