YubiKey Cloning Attack - Revision history

LTrifunovic at 20:50, 19 December 2024

2024-12-19T20:50:40Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:50, 19 December 2024
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	== References ==		== References ==
	*https://github.com/htr-tech/zphisher
	*https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/		*https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/


	[[Category:Documentation]]		[[Category:Documentation]]

2024-12-19T11:39:44Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:39, 19 December 2024
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	== References ==		== References ==
	https://github.com/htr-tech/zphisher		*https://github.com/htr-tech/zphisher
			*https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/
	https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/


	[[Category:Documentation]]		[[Category:Documentation]]

2024-12-19T11:39:05Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:39, 19 December 2024
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	== References ==		== References ==
	https://github.com/htr-tech/zphisher		https://github.com/htr-tech/zphisher

	https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/		https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/


	[[Category:Documentation]]		[[Category:Documentation]]

2024-12-19T11:38:54Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:38, 19 December 2024
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	*Constant Time Operation: Ensuring all cryptographic operations take a fixed amount of time, timing-related variations can be eliminated because patterns cannot be seen anymore in the measurements.		*Constant Time Operation: Ensuring all cryptographic operations take a fixed amount of time, timing-related variations can be eliminated because patterns cannot be seen anymore in the measurements.
	*Physical Shielding: Adding physical shielding to the chip can reduce electromagnetic emissions. This limits the ability of attackers to measure or capture signals in the first place.		*Physical Shielding: Adding physical shielding to the chip can reduce electromagnetic emissions. This limits the ability of attackers to measure or capture signals in the first place.

			== References ==
			https://github.com/htr-tech/zphisher
			https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/


	[[Category:Documentation]]		[[Category:Documentation]]

2024-12-18T20:52:35Z

@@ Line 97: / Line 97: @@
 *Constant Time Operation: Ensuring all cryptographic operations take a fixed amount of time, timing-related variations can be eliminated because patterns cannot be seen anymore in the measurements.
 *Physical Shielding: Adding physical shielding to the chip can reduce electromagnetic emissions. This limits the ability of attackers to measure or capture signals in the first place.
 [[Category:Documentation]]

2024-12-18T20:51:57Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:51, 18 December 2024
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	=== Recommendation for Users ===		=== Recommendation for Users ===

			For users, its important to keep the affected YubiKey at a safe place where no one can have physical access to it. If the attacker doesn't get physical access to the YubiKey, no clone can be created.

	=== Recommendation for Manufactures ===		=== Recommendation for Manufactures ===

			Hardware-Token manufactures also have a few options to prevent Side-Channel-Attacks:

			*Noise injection: By adding artificial noise during the cryptographic operations, the Side-Channel-Measurements can be significantly harder to analyze
			*Constant Time Operation: Ensuring all cryptographic operations take a fixed amount of time, timing-related variations can be eliminated because patterns cannot be seen anymore in the measurements.
			*Physical Shielding: Adding physical shielding to the chip can reduce electromagnetic emissions. This limits the ability of attackers to measure or capture signals in the first place.

2024-12-18T20:40:36Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:40, 18 December 2024
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	[[File:Yubi6.PNG\|200px]]		[[File:Yubi6.PNG\|200px]]

			=== Practical Execution of an Attack ===
			There are six steps on how a YubiKey Cloning Attack could look like:

	~~=== Practical Execution~~ of ~~an Attack ===~~		*1) Obtaining Login Credentials of a website that is secured with a YubiKey
			*2) The attacker needs temporary access to the YubiKey
			*3) Conducting Side-Channel-Measurements
			*4) Returning the YubiKey unknowingly to the victim
			*5) Analyzing and interpreting the measurements
			*6) Creating a YubiKey clone, which can be used as long as the website credentials don't change.

	=== Affected Versions ===		=== Affected Versions ===

			The affected YubiKey is the 5-Series with any firmware below the version 5.7. Because of the fact that YubiKey's firmware cannot be updated, the vulnerability remains permanently.

	== Counter-Measurements==		== Counter-Measurements==

2024-12-18T20:31:13Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:31, 18 December 2024
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	A fundamental aspect of ECDSA is its one-way nature: It is easy to compute kG but extremely difficult to determine k if only kG is known.		A fundamental aspect of ECDSA is its one-way nature: It is easy to compute kG but extremely difficult to determine k if only kG is known.

			The private-key d can be calculated using following formula, in which only k and d are unknown:

			[[File:Yubi5.PNG\|200px]]

			After analyzing the Side-Channel-Measurements, the attackers try to extract the variable k, with which they can then calculate the Private-key d.

			To verify, whether the extraction of k was successful, the public-key can be validated with following formula:

			[[File:Yubi6.PNG\|200px]]


	=== Practical Execution of an Attack ===		=== Practical Execution of an Attack ===

2024-12-18T20:26:48Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:26, 18 December 2024
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	[[File:Curve_self.PNG\|400px]]		[[File:Curve_self.PNG\|400px]]

			The final point after k iterations is denoted as kG, which is important for generating keys and signatures.

			A fundamental aspect of ECDSA is its one-way nature: It is easy to compute kG but extremely difficult to determine k if only kG is known.

	=== Practical Execution of an Attack ===		=== Practical Execution of an Attack ===

2024-12-18T20:22:10Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:22, 18 December 2024
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	=== ECDSA ===		=== ECDSA ===

			Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is one of the most used cryptographic methods encountered daily.
			The Concept of ECDSA is a curve that is symmetric about the x-axis. The process begins with selecting a starting point G on this curve and drawing a straight line through G, intersecting the curve in another point. The intersected point is then reflected across the x-axis and producing a new point G2. This procedure continues for k-times, where k is a very large number.

			The general equation for an elliptic curve is:

			[[File:Yubi4.PNG\|200px]]

			[[File:Curve_self.PNG\|400px]]

	=== Practical Execution of an Attack ===		=== Practical Execution of an Attack ===